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ARE WE PROTECTING THE PAST?
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND HISTORICAL PROPERTY
PRESERVATION LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The battle between historical preservation and urban progress repre-
sents one of the most difficult balancing acts in the law today. It is a
question of whether cities should turn away from their historic past to
make room for future developments. It is an issue between preserva-
tion and progress, and it affects nearly every part of the country as this
nation grows older.
In the historic Reeves Drive area of Grand Forks, North Dakota, the
twin aims of preserving our past while ensuring the city's growth and
prosperity are currently clashing.1 Proposed changes in the roadways
and driving patterns threaten one of the oldest residential neighborhoods
in the state. 2 The Reeves Drive example 3 represents just one of the
problems surfacing in North Dakota in the area of historical preser-
vation. 4 With such instances on the rise, it is important to evaluate North
Dakota's historical preservation law and determine its effectiveness and
ability to balance the twin aims of preservation and progress.5
A. HISTORICAL PRESERVATION IN GENERAL
Historical preservation is generally a statutory provision which pro-
hibits the alteration or demolition of certain historic buildings without
consent. 6 Historical preservation is quite often accomplished by using
the historical easement as a tool to preserve specific property. 7 Statutory
in nature, historical easements have been held to be a viable restraint
1. See Lori Nitschke, Over the River and Through the Granitoid, GRAND FORKS H ERALD, Aug. 15,
1994 at B I. The article discusses proposed changes to the streets and traffic patterns in the Historic
Reeves Drive Area of Grand Forks. Id. The streets are predominantly paved with Granitoid, a
surface which provided solid traction for both horse drawn carriages and early cars. id. Granitoid
was invented by R.S. Blome in the 1910s, and Grand Forks is believed to have more Granitoid surface
left than any other city in North America. Id. In the Reeves Drive Area, property found on thirty two
blocks is listed on state and national historical registers. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994). Mr. Hafermehl commented on current problems with renovations to
the Cass County Courthouse in Fargo, North Dakota, property which is on the National Register of
Historic Places. Id.
5. Id. See also Robert Beck, North Dakota's Historical Preservation Law, 53 N.D. L. REV. 177,
194-95 (1976) (stating that the North Dakota's historical preservation law is not unified and the law's
precise authority is unclear).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 730 (6th ed. 1990).
7. See 3 RICHARO R. POWELL & PATRICK J. R OHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.03 (Supp.
1995) (stating that conservation easements are used to create historically protected easements on
property).
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upon the use of property.8 This is true, even though historical and
conservation easements reject the most basic common law requirements
of easements, 9 and amount to a property restriction which is in gross,
assignable, and runs with the land. 10 Also, even though the conservation
easement is named an easement, common law terminology associated
with easements is generally not helpful and the easements should be
interpreted based on their statutory language alone."
Historical easements, like conservation easements, are easements in
name only.12 Many states, 13 including North Dakota,14 place in their
statutory preservation schemes specific affirmative burdens on owners
of historically designated parcels of real property.15 Therefore, be-
cause of these affirmative burdens, a historical easement should not be
considered an easement in the classical, common law sense: It is not a
right to move across another's property.1 6 Instead, historical easements
should be considered restrictive covenants or negative easements.17
Because of the restrictions and duties associated with historical ease-
ments, a major issue regarding the placement of these burdens is wheth-
er there a system of review for the owner of the historically designated
property to challenge the designation. If owners wish to alter or demol-
8. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The United States
Supreme Court found that the application of New York City's Historical Preservation Law, N.Y.C.
ADM1N. CODE ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 (1976) (currently codified at § 25-303 (1990)), did not amount to a
constitutional taking of property rights, and the protections provided by the City's ordinance were
substantially related to the proper use of historical landmarks. Penn Cent. Transp.Co., 438 U.S. at 138.
See infra Part I.B (discussing the Penn Cent. case and its significance).
9. 3 POWELL, supra note 7, § 34A.01. See also id. § 34.02[11] (stating that common law elements
for an easement are: 1) an interest in land in the possession of another, 2) an interest of a limited use
or enjoyment of the land, which 3) can be protected against interference by third persons, and 4)
cannot be terminated at the will of the possessor of the servient land, and 5) is not a normal incident of
a possessory land interest, and 6) is capable of creation by conveyance). Because of their statutory
nature, conservation easements reject these principles. Id.
10. Id. § 34A.01. The lack of such restrictions demonstrates the rejection of the basic common
law principles.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 34A.01.
13. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (providing a complete listing of all states which use
historical easements in their historical preservation efforts).
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(3) (1993) North Dakota defines historical easements as:
a. A nonpossessory interest in the real property, imposing limitations or affirmative
obligations the purposes of which include preserving the historic aspects of the property
as so restored, reconstructed, or improved;
b. Created and capable of being conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified,
terminated, or otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements,
except as otherwise provided in this subsection; provided, that no right or duty in favor of
or against a holder or another party having a right of enforcement arises under a historic
easement before it is accepted by the holder and the acceptance is recorded.
Id.
15. Id.




ish any historical property, do the statutes which created the preserva-
tion law allow for an efficient and simple way to achieve their desires?
B. OUTLINE OF THIS NOTE
This Note, generally, will explore the process of review for alteration
and demolition requests involving historically protected property. Spe-
cifically, it will detail the process that North Dakota has created. Further-
more, this Note will propose possible changes to the current North Dako-
ta system of review. 18
Part II will discuss the scope and constitutionality of historical ease-
ments. Part III will detail the development of historical preservation
law and analyze the current federal and state review systems, as well as
North Dakota's review system. Part IV will discuss the consequences
of North Dakota's current historical preservation law. Lastly, Part V
will propose possible changes to the North Dakota system of review
and demonstrate how these proposals could better serve North Dakota
and its preservation efforts as the state moves further into its second cen-
tury.
II. DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
HISTORICAL EASEMENTS
A. DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF HISTORICAL EASEMENTS
Historical easements fall under the larger category of conservation
easements. 19 Conservation easements have been described as non-
possessory interests in real property which impose certain limitations
and/or affirmative obligations to preserve the historical, cultural, architect-
ural, or archeological qualities of the property. 20 This language is
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08 (1993). Currently, the North Dakota system provides that:
1. The state ... each city, county, school district, and other body corporate and politic,
are ... notified of the existence of state historic sites ....
2. Neither the state nor any of the instrumentalities of government ... may demolish or
cause to alter the physical features or historic character of any site listed in the state
historic sites registry . .. without first obtaining the prior approval thereof from the
superintendent of the state historical board upon authorization of the state historical
board. It is the responsibility of the state or instrumentalities of government . . . to
cooperate with the state historical board in identifying and implementing any reasonable
alternative to demolition or alteration of any state historic site before the board approves
such demolition or alteration.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(l)-(2) (1993). See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text
(discussing the creation and application of North Dakota's arbitration system of review).
19. 3 POWELL, supra note 7, § 34A.02[1]. The conservation easement developed with the idea of
protecting scenic views. Id. Today, this has expanded to include nearly all forms of open space
protection, as well as preservation of historical facades and historical property. Id.
20. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT Acr § 1, 12 U.L.A. 70 (1995 Supp.).
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embodied in North Dakota law. 2 1 These statutorily created easements, in
most states, have the broad purpose of protecting natural, scenic, and
open-space areas of real estate. 22 The easements can also be used to
preserve the historic, archaeological, architectural, or cultural character
of the property. 23
B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HISTORICAL EASEMENTS
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided what is un-
doubtably the most important case dealing with a challenge to historical
preservation efforts accomplished through historical easements.24 In
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 25 the Court faced
the issue of whether placing property on the National Register of Histor-
ic Places and giving it heightened protection under New York City's
historical preservation law26 amounted to an unconstitutional taking. 27
Penn Central was challenging a New York City ordinance 28 that pro-
hibited it from building a fifty-three story office tower over Grand Cen-
tral Station, property which Penn Central owned. 29 Penn Central ar-
gued that the statutory prohibition was a taking in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore required just compensation
by the city of New York.30 The regulations, Penn Central argued, pro-
hibited owners from using property as they wished. 31
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated first that a city may en-
act land-use restrictions to preserve the character and enhance the quality
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(3) (1993). Although' North Dakota adopts part of the Uniform
Act's language, North Dakota provisions go on to further define historical easements as property:
Created and capable of being conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modified,
terminated, or otherwise altered or affected in the same manner as other easements....
provided, that no right or duty in favor of or against a holder or another party having a
right of enforcement arises under a historic easement before it is accepted by the holder
and the acceptance is recorded; [and] [hield by the grantee for the benefit of its citizens
and the people of the state generally ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(3)(b)-(3)(c).
22. 3 POWELL, supra note 7, § 34.03[11]. Statutory easements generally extend protection for
agricultural, recreational, natural resource, and forest lands. Id. Protection through statutory
easements has also been extended to protect and improve water and air quality. Id.
23. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 72 (Supp. 1995). This act was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1981. 12 U.L.A.
68 (Supp. 1995).
24. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (involving the
preservation of Grand Central Station in New York City).
25. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A § 205-1.0 (1978) (currently codified at § 25-303 (1990)).
27. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978).
28. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A § 205-1.0 (1978).
29. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 116-17.




of their city. 32 To support this position, the Court cited City of New Or-
leans v. Dukes ,33 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 34 and Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas.35 In City of New Orleans v. Dukes,36 the Court
had stated that the New Orleans government could enact administrative
code provisions which controlled the number of street vendors in the
French Quarter during peak traffic periods of the day. 37 Furthermore, in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,38 the Court held that cities were
constitutionally permitted to create special zoning requirements for
adult pornographic theaters. 39 The Court also cited to Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,40 which provided that a city may restrict residential
land use to single family dwellings.4 1
Next, the Court held the historical preservation of Grand Central
Station could not be considered an unconstitutional taking in the
traditional sense, which required a complete deprivation of the economic
use of the property. 42 For the basis of what a traditional taking was, the
Court cited United States v. Causby,43 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,44 Armstrong v. United States ,45 and Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter.
46
In United States v. Causby,4 7 the Court held that government air
flights over property which served as a chicken farm was a taking, be-
cause the flights acquired part of the property used for a uniquely public
function. 48 The Court in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,49 found that a
complete destruction, under statutory authority, of the property hold-
er's use and value of the property constituted a taking.50 Pennsylvania
Coal stands for the basic idea that when there is an action which causes
32. Id. at 138.
33. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
34. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
35. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
36. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
37. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297. 304-05 (1976) (stating that the legislature could
have intended to preserve the historic charm of the city).
38. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
39. Young v. American Mini-Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976).
40. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
41. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,7-9 (1974).
42. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-38 (1978).
43. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
44. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
45. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
46. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 127-28 (discussing
unconstitutional takings).
47. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
48. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,267 (1946).
49. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
50. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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complete destruction of the owners use, a taking has occurred. 51 Exam-
ples of this are Armstrong v. United States,52 where the Court found a
taking for the complete destruction of a materialman's lien, 53 and Hud-
son County Water Co. v. McCarter,54 where it was held that property re-
strictions which made property useless were not within the state's police
power and amounted to a taking.55
Using this reasoning, the Court found that the historical preservation
protection did not deprive Penn Central of the designated use of the
property, and thus was not a taking. 56 Furthermore, even if the Court
had determined a taking occurred, they had previously stated that an or-
dinance which denied the use of property with a substantial public pur-
pose in mind was not a taking.57 In Penn Central, the Court and the par-
ties recognized the substantial value of historical preservation. 58 Thus,
historical easements created for preservation which do not deny the own-
er the designated use of the property are not considered an unconstitu-
tional taking requiring adequate compensation. 59
III. DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL
PRESERVATION LAWS
A. HISTORY OF HISTORICAL PRESERVATION
1. Federal Efforts
Historical preservation law was first addressed at a national level in
the late Nineteenth Century. 60 Citizens, concerned with the deteriora-
tion of President George Washington's home, sought ways to preserve
the landmark, but neither the state of Virginia nor the federal govern-
51. Id. at 414.
52. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
53. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
54. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
55. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,355 (1908).
56. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
57. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590. 594 (1962). In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, the Court
stated that when an ordinance does not prohibit reasonable use for the land, and is done in the best
interest of the public, no taking has occurred. Id.
58. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 129.
59. Id. at 138. The Court held that the restrictions imposed by the city were related to the general
welfare of the citizens. Id. Also, the restrictions still allowed Penn Central "reasonable beneficial
use" of the property. Id.
60. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL PRESERVATION ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1457, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N 6378, 6381 [hereinafter PRESERVATION ACT AMENDMENTS]. This material gives an
excellent history of federal efforts directed toward historical preservation. See also Melissa E.
Honsermyer, Comment, The Fate of Historical Preservation Laws in Pennsylvania, 97 DICK. L. REV.
719,726-27 (1993) (discussing the historical development of federal historical preservation).
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ment offered any assistance. 61 Thus, the task was left to private organi-
zations, most notably the Mount Vernon Ladies' Association.
62
The next preservation effort was attempted in the early Twentieth
Century, when Congress passed the Antiquities Act of 1906.63 This Act
was primarily passed to create the Mesa Verde National Park and protect
it from over-zealous treasure hunters. 64 However, the 1906 Act also
included provisions which allowed the President to establish historical
landmarks on federal lands and give these landmarks special protec-
tion .65
Federal preservation efforts continued in 1935 with the passage of
the Historical Sites Act.66 The 1935 Act was created to preserve objects
of national significance 67 and was the forerunner to the National Histori-
cal Preservation Act of 1966.68 The legislation also created the Nation-
al Park System Advisory Board, whose duties were to oversee historical
matters in the National Park System.69
In 1949, the federal government chartered the National Trust for
Historical Preservation. 70 The National Trust was established as a
non-profit organization whose mandate was to "encourage public
participation in the preservation of America's historic and architectural
heritage." 7 ! Under the National Trust, historical preservation efforts
expanded in the Post-World War II years.72
No other separate national legislation was passed regarding histori-
cal preservation and property protection for the next sixteen years. But
in 1965, under the guidance of President Lyndon Johnson, 73 Congress
61. PRESERVATION ACT AMENDMENTS, supra note 60, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6380-81.
62. Id.
63. Pub. L. No. 59-209.34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431433 (1988)). See
also PRESERVATION ACT AMENDMENTS, supra note 60, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6381 (stating the passage of
the 1906 Act was directed at protection of federal lands).
64. PRESERVATION ACT AMENDMENTS, supra note 60, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6381.
65. Id.
66. Pub. L. No. 74-292,49 Stat. 666 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1988)).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
68. Id. § 470 (1988). See discussion infra Part III.B.l (discussing the method of application for
the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 463 (1988).
70. Id. § 468 (1988). See also PRESERVATION ACT AMENDMENTS. supra note 60, 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6381 (stating that the National Trust was created to strengthen the private sector's role
in historical preservation).
71. J. Jackson, National Trust for Historic Preservation President, Forward to MARGARET DAVIS,
NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, STATE LEGISLATION PROJECT: STATE SYSTEMS FOR
DESIGNATING HISTORIC PROPERTIES AND THE RESULTS OF DESIGNATION (1987).
72. PRESERVATION ACT AMENDMENTS, supra note 60, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6381. This expansion
included, with the help of the Smithsonian Institution, the establishment of the River Basin Surveys. Id.
This survey was created to salvage historical artifacts damaged during the massive Federal reservoir
construction in the late 1940s. Id.
73. HOUSE PUBLIC WORKS COMM., HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION ACT OF 1965, H.R. REP. No. 1084,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3710.
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passed the Highway Beautification Act of 1965.7 4 The Act provided
for the upkeep, general maintenance, and landscaping of the federal
highway system. 75 This legislation, providing for the cleaning up of
America's highways, has been considered the basic foundation for con-
servation and historical protection found in the 1966 Historical Preserva-
tion Act.76
The 1966 Historical Preservation Act 77 [hereinafter, the 1966 Act]
was the first major piece of federal legislation dedicated to the preserva-
tion of all of the nation's historical property. 78 The 1966 Act stated
that preservation of the United States' historical property should be a
major goal of the federal government. 79
In the 1966 Act, 80 Congress laid out specific goals of preserving
all buildings and areas of real property which provide substantial bene-
fits to the heritage of the country. 81 However, the statute gives defer-
ence to the State Historical Preservation Officer [hereinafter, SHPO] of
each state to determine which property in their respective state is wor-
thy of national historical recognition and preservation. 82 The legisla-
tion also created the National Register of Historic Places 83 [hereinafter,
the National Register] and provided a listing of criteria which the SHPO
74. Pub. L. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028, 1030, 1032 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319
(1988)).
75. 23 U.S.C. § 319 (1988). Furthermore, the Highway Beautification Act also called for
restrictions on billboards, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1988) and junkyards, 23 U.S.C. § 136 (1988).
76. See 3 POWELL, supra note 7, § 34A.02[l] (stating that the creation of scenic highway
easements gave way to the use of easements for broader purposes). See also WILLIAM H. WHYTE,
THE LAST LANDSCAPE 287-88 (1968) (discussing the historic value of scenic roadways, particularly in
the Cape Cod area of Massachusetts).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988).
78. Id. See also PRESERVATION ACT AMENDMENTS, supra note 60, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382 (stating
that the 1966 Act was the first statute which recognized the importance of historical preservation on
national, state, and local levels). CompareHistoric Sites Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (providing
legislation that dealt primarily with historical preservation within the context of the National Park
System). See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing the scope and reasons for passage
of the 1935 Act).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988). The legislation recognized that historical preservation actions prior
to 1966 were mainly taken by private organizations, but provided that::
[lit is nevertheless necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to accelerate
its historic preservation programs and activities, to give maximum encouragement to
agencies and individuals undertaking preservation by private means, and to assist state
and local governments and the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and activities.
16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(7).
80. Id. § 470.
81. Id. § 470(a).
82. Id. § 470(a)(b)(3)(A). See also 36 C.F.R. § 60.6(a) (1993) (stating that "[tihe State Historic
Preservation Officer is responsible for identifying and nominating eligible properties to the National
Register").
83. 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(l)(a) (1988).
1038 [VOL. 71:1031
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should consider when nominating property for placement on the Nation-
al Register. 84
The 1966 Act received a major overhaul in 1980, when it was
amended to include, most notably, an owner consent provision.8 5 This
provision enables the owner of property recommended for designation
to object to the designation. 86 Until the objection is withdrawn, the prop-
erty cannot be placed on the National Register.87
The 1966 Act has no provisions regarding any alteration or
demolition requests, except for requests of boundary and relocation
changes of historical property. 88 However, when federal funds, licensing,
or involvement are present, there are special procedures to review
alteration and demolition requests. 89 When there is no federal involve-
ment, review processes for state or private projects are determined by
individual states. 90
84. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1993). The criteria for consideration includes property which has:
[A] quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering,
and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess
integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association and
(a)that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad
patterns of our history, or ... (c)that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type,
period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess
high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose
components may lack individual distinction[.]
Types of sites which should be considered include religious property, birthplaces and gravesites,
cemeteries, buildings, and property primarily of commemorative value. Id.
85. Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2988 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(6) (1988)).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(6) (1988).
87. Id.
88. 36 C.F.R. § 60.14 (1993).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 470(f)(1988). See Pub. L. 89-665, Title I § 106, Oct. 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 917 (pro-
viding that the head of any federal agency must take into account the effect that any federally funded
or licensed project will have on historical property). See also 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.3-800.9 (1993)
(providing that all agency heads or officials, at the commencement of a federally funded project must
identify all historic property, and assess the effects the project will have on such property). Section
470(f) provides that prior to any expenditure of federal funds or any undertaking in which the federal
government is a party to, there must be consideration as to whether the proposed undertaking will
impact property on the National Register or property eligible for placement on the National Register.
16 U.S.C. § 470(f). Inquiries are made to the Advisory Council on Historical Preservation, and the
petitioners must give this board a "reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such [an]
undertaking." 16 U.S.C. § 470(f). This has become known as a "section 106 review process." 36
C.F.R. § 800.1 (1993).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(l)(B)(3)-(4) (1988). The federal statute, when there is no federal
involvement, defers to the states by providing that::
(3) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (6), any State which is carrying out a
program approved under subsection (b) of this section, shall nominate to the Secretary
properties which meet the criteria promulgated under subsection (a) of this section for
inclusion on the National Register. ...
(4) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (6) the Secretary may accept a
nomination directly from any person or local government for inclusion of a property on
the National Register only if property is located in a State where there is no program
approved under subsection (b) of this section.
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2. North Dakota's Historical Preservation Efforts
Following the lead from the federal government's decision that
historical preservation should be a national goal, 91 North Dakota, in
1967, passed the Preservation of Historic Sites and Antiquities Act
[hereinafter, the North Dakota Act] .92
The North Dakota Act basically follows the preservation goals es-
tablished by the federal government. 93 However under North Dakota
law, there is no definitively spelled out review process for any action
which may have an adverse effect on historical property when the ac-
tors are private property owners. 94 But, even though there is no legisla-
tively declared process for private citizens, the North Dakota Act has cre-
ated a very unique review process for actions which affect historical
property when the actor is a public body or political subdivision.9 5
The review process involves the use of a specially impaneled arbitration
review board. 96 When a public body submits an application to the His-
torical Board to alter or demolish historical property, and the applica-
tion is denied, the political subdivision can file for arbitration. 97 This re-
view process, created in 1987 by legislative amendment, 98 has never
been tested, but it appears that future challenges could be very near.99
91. Id. §§ 470-71.
92. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 55-10-01 to -13 (1993).
93. Id.
94. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Pre-
servation Officer (Sept 30, 1994). Mr. Hafermehl did state that it appears possible that a private
citizen could seek what would likely amount to a form of administrative review by the state historical
board, but no distinct challenges of this nature have been made. Id.
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1993).
96. Id.
97. See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text (discussing the creation the application of
North Dakota's arbitration review system).
98. North Dakota Senate Comm. on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387 (April 3. 1987). The amendment was debated following the first challenge to
North Dakota's historical preservation law. See County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371
N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1985) (challenging the authority of the State Historical Society).
99. Telephone interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical
Preservation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994). Currently, there are pressing issues involving historical
preservation in North Dakota. Id. The most visible of these are the proposed traffic changes to the
Reeves Drive area of Grand Forks and the proposed alterations to the Cass County Courthouse in
Fargo. See supra notes 1-3 (discussing the preservation of Grand Forks' Granitoid streets and the Cass
County Courthouse, both current historical preservation problems in North Dakota).
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
1. The Federal Review System
The Federal government's system of review provides great defer-
ence to the SHPO's determination of property eligible for inclusion on
the National Register.OO This also applies to any applications for chang-
es and revisions of property on the National Register.'Ol Federal agen-
cies have the ability to nominate property as well, but such nominations
must be made with the advice of the SHPO of the state in which the
property is located.102  It is the duty of the SHPO to recommend any
property within the state which they deem eligible for inclusion on the
National Register.103 The SHPO must also assist the federal govern-
ment in any historical preservation undertaking which the federal gov-
ernment has initiated. 104
When a federal agency or federally funded project seeks to alter
or destroy historic property, the federal government is required seek
the advice of the SHPO to aid in the project.105 Here, the SHPO is re-
quired to determine if an adverse effect to the historical property will re-
sult if the proposed alterations or demolitions occur. 106 If there is such
an effect, the SHPO must consider any possible alternatives to minimize
the effect on the historical property.l07
The federal review process requires the presence of federal funds
or assistance,108 and the property must be on, or eligible to be on, the
100. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1993) (stating that the SHPO is responsible for "identifying and
nominating eligible properties to the National Register").
101. See Id. § 60.14 (stating that it is the duty of the SHPO to review all proposed boundary
alterations and proposed relocations of historical property.)
102. Id. § 60.9(a). The regulation requires that all National Register nominations by federal
agencies be submitted to the SHPO for comment. id. § 60.9(c).
103. Id. § 60.6(a).
104. Id. § 60.3(m)-(n).
105. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(c)(1)(ii) (1993). It is the duty of the SHPO, under the § 106 process, to
assess any effects upon historical property, and consider any possible alternative measures which may
reduce the effect of any alterations or demolitions. Id. See supra note 89 (explaining the § 106
process).
106. 36 C.F.R. § 800.9 (1993). The SHPO should consider these factors: Physical damage or
destruction, isolation of the property, introduction of elements outside the character of the property,
neglect of the historic property, lease, or transfer or sale of the property. Id. The SHPO is not limited
to these items alone and may consider any aspect of change which may affect the property's setting,
location or use. Id.
107. Id. § 800.1(c)(I)(ii).
108. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the federal, or § 106, review process).
See also 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(c) (1993) (stating that a § 106 process must be completed by an agency
official prior to the commencement of any federally funded project).
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National Register. 109 If these criteria are not present, the federal system
of review, or Section 106 review process, will not come into effect."l 0
2. State Systems
Because of the limited applicability of the federal Section 106 re-
view process,"I' every state has adopted legislation providing for protec-
tion of historical property, and for review processes which aid the state
in historical preservation."12
However, although all states have legislation to preserve historical
property, they all use different review processes to achieve their individu-
al preservation goals."l 3 Many of the states use a review process similar
to a federal Section 106 review.11 4 In these states, political subdivisions
must inform the state historical preservation officer of any work which
may encroach on historical property or property eligible for preserva-
tion protection.' 15 Any decision made by the state historical board is
109. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the federal § 106 review process); see
also 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(e) (1993) (stating that historic property is property which is on or eligible to be
on the National Register, including artifacts, records and any remains located within the historical
property).
110. 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(c) (1993); see supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the
Federal section 196 review process).
111. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the federal § 106 review process).
112. ALA. CODE § 11-68-13 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.35.070, 41.35.090 (1993); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-863, -864 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-7-109 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 5024.5 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-80.1-104 (West 1988); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-Ih(b)(4) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 551 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
267.061(2)(d) (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-27 (Harrison 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 6E-8,
-10 (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 67-4601 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 20, para. 3410/7
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1-18 (Bums 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 303.30 (West
1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 (1989 & Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.381(7)(d)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:2212.1 (West 1989); ME. REV. STAT.ANN.tit.
33, § 1553 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); MD. ANN.CODE of 1957 art. 83B, § 5-617 (1991); MASS.GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 9, § 27B (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 399.205 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.665(1) (West 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 39-7-1I (1990); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 253.408(7) (Vernon 1990); Mor. CODE ANN. § 22-3-431 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. 72 §
810 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.085 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227-C:26 (Supp.
1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-15.131 (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-9.1 (Michie 1991); N.Y.
PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. § 37B-14.09 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-12(a) (1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.55 (Baldwin 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 355 (West 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 358.640 (1993); 37 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510 (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-7
(1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-17-20 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIRED LAWS ANN. § 1-19A-1 1.1
(1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-11-111 (1991); TEX. GOV'TCODE ANN. § 442.016 (West 1990); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 9-8-404 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6092 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-503.2
(Michie 1989 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 27.34.220 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE §
29-1-8 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 44.22.1 (West Supp. 1993); WYO.STAT. §§ 36-4-108, -113 (Supp.
1994).
113. 3 POWELL, supra note 7, § 34A.03[4].
114. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing application of the federal § 106
review process).
115. ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.35.070,41.35.090; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-863. -864; CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 5024.5; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-80.1-104; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22A-IH; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 267.061(2)( D); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 6E-8, -10; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 20, para. 3410/7; IND.
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appealable to higher authorities. 1 16 Other states provide little or no
protection of the historical property and the owners or occupiers can use
the property as they please."i 7 Some states, such as New Mexico, require
the owner to obtain a special permit prior to any alteration or
demolition." 18
New Jersey, for example, which has an administrative review pro-
cess similar to the federal Section 106 process,119 provides that the state
historical board must make a decision either to grant or deny an alter-
ation or demolition request within one hundred and twenty days, or the
application is deemed granted. 120 This provision is intended to give the
historical preservation office time to gather information and make an in-
formed judgment as to the historical value of the property, and whether
the proposed changes would have an effect on that value.
12 1
There are no state historical preservation laws which provide for an
arbitration review system like North Dakota's. 122 Most states provide for
an administrative process reviewable by the court systems of the state.
12 3
However, Minnesota's review process seems to provide the most similar
review process. 124 Minnesota provides for mediation service between the
state historical preservation office and the aggrieved party.1
25
CODE ANN. § 14-21-1-18: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2212.1. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1553; M D. ANN. C ODE OF 1957 ART. 83B, § 5-617; M ASS. G EN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9 §
27C; MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 399.205; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.665(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-3-431;
NEB. REV. STAT. 72 § 810; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227-C:26; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-9.1; N.Y. PARKS
REC. & HIST. PRESERV. § 37B-14.09; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-12(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.55; R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-7; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19A-11.1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-11-111; TEX.
GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 442.016; UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-8-404; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6092.
116. See id. (listing all the states which provide for a review system similar to the federal § 106
process).
117. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-7-109 (Mitchie Supp. 1993) (providing that any listing will not
abridge the owner's rights to use the property); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 355 (West 1991) (providing
that any listing will not abridge the owner's right to use the property).
118. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-9.1 (Mitchie 1991).
119. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the federal § 106 review process).
120. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1B-15.131 (West 1991).
121. See In Re North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 417 A.2d 1095, 1115 (N.J. 1980)
(holding that the 120 day period was a valid exercise of the historical preservation office's power, and
was intended to be a fact gathering period).
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6)(1993). See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text
(discussing the creation and application of North Dakota's arbitration system of review).
123. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (listing those states which have review systems
similar to the federal § 106 review process and provide for greater involvement of the state's
historical agency in preservation issues).
124. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.665 (West 1994).
125. Id. § 138.665(3).
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Many states use the historical preservation district to protect large
areas of historical property.1 26 These states, when dealing with proper-
ty in the historical district, use a system of review for alteration and de-
molition requests called a certificate of appropriateness.127
Under the certificate of appropriateness process, the request to al-
ter or demolish the historical property is made to the SHPO.128 The
SHPO holds hearings to review the application.129 At the hearing, the
applicants present their case, and bear the burden of persuasion to show
the SHPO the necessity for the alteration or demolition.130 It is within
the power of the SHPO or review commission to deny the application
for alteration or demolition. 131 If the request is denied, the applicant
can appeal to the district court1 32 or a general governing body of the
county in which the property is located.133
a. Examples of Historical Preservation Issues in State
Courts
While the effectiveness of historical preservation efforts differ
from state to state, it is generally believed that historical preservation is
gaining greater acceptance.1 34 The trend is to follow the 1966 Act and
provide legislation which states that historical preservation of land-
marks is in the state's best interest.135 The trend towards historical pres-
ervation acceptance can be seen in several recent decisions in state cases
where courts have shown their willingness to accept historical preserva-
126. See ALA. CODE § 11-68-13 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-147e (1989); GA. CODEANN. §
44-10-27 (Harrison 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-7-11-1 to 36-7-11-18 (Bums 1989 & 1994 Supp.);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 303.34 (West 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25:738 (West 1989); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 384.120 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-397 (1987): S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
1-19B-42 (1992); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 13-7-407 (1992).
127. See infra notes 129-134 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the historical
preservation district and the use of the certificate of appropriateness review system).
128. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-68-9 (providing that nothing can be done to historical property
until the certificate of appropriateness is granted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Sherman v. Dayton Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 616 N.E.2d 937 (Ohio App. 2d 1992).
In Sherman, the court found that it was within the City of Dayton's authority to deny an alteration
application from an owner of historical property. Id. at 937. The owner wished to place wrought iron
bars on the windows of his shop. Id. The court held that the denying the placement of the bars was
not outside the historical commission's authority in protecting the historical district. Id. at 940.
132. See ALA. CODE § 11-68-10 (1994 Supp.) (providing an appeal to the circuit court where the
property is located).
133. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-280) (Harrison 1991) (providing an appeal process to the
municipal governing body of the area in which the property is located).
134. MARGARET DAVIS, NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, STATE LEGISLATION PROJECT:




tion, even in situations where the preservation is accomplished through
means other than the state's historical preservation statute. 136
For example, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Whiteacre v. State of
Indiana1 37 found that the provisions of Indiana's historical preserva-
tion law 138 applied to private landowners as well as public. 139 This deci-
sion affirmed rulings at the trial court and appellate court levels. 140
In Whiteacre, two amateur archaeologists, Robert Whiteacre and his
wife, discovered a Hopewell Indian site on their property and began
excavating the site in search of historical artifacts.141 After being
informed by the local Indiana Department of Natural Resource office
(INDR) that a permit was required to excavate the site, Whiteacre
researched the law and concluded the permit was not necessary because
the site was on private land.142 The appellate court held that private
property is subject to the historical preservation law in the same manner
as public property. 143 The court based its reasoning largely on the intent
of the historical preservation statute. 144  The policy portion of the
statute1 45 provided that the state encouraged preservation and continuous
protection of historic sites and aided in the organization of local
historical societies, both public and private.146 Thus, to effectively
pursue the goal of historical protection for the citizens of the state, the
appellate court found that the inclusion of private property within the
provisions of the statute was necessary.147 This reasoning was affirmed
by the Indiana Supreme Court.148 Whiteacre represents an example of
the expansive reading that historical preservation statutes are more
readily receiving today.
Another example of a state court's acceptance of historical
preservation ideals can be found in Minnesota.149 Minnesota has a
136. See infra notes 138-182 and accompanying text (discussing several decisions in state courts
which deal with historical preservation issues, and the general acceptance that historical preservation
has gained judicially).
137. 629 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1994).
138. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-21-21-1-1 to 14-21-1-31 (Bums 1995).
139. Whiteacre v. State of Indiana, 629 N.E.2d 1236. 1237 (Ind. 1994).
140. Id. (adopting the decision of Whiteacre v. State, 619 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)).
141. Whiteacre, 619 N.E.2d at 606.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 607-08.
144. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-3-3.4-14 (Bums 1990) (currently codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§
14-21-1-12, 14-21-1-13 (Bums 1995)).
145. IND. CODE ANN. § 14-3-3.4-2 (Burns 1990) (currently codified at IND. CODE ANN. §
14-21-1-12 (BURNS 1995)).
146. Whiteacre, 619 N.E.2d at 606 (citing Indiana Dept. of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal
Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Ind. 1989)).
147. Whiteacre, 619 N.E.2d at 607-08.
148. Whiteacre, 629 N.E.2d at 1236.
149. State by Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1993).
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mediation system of review which more closely resembles North
Dakota's arbitration system of review than any other state's historical
preservation statute. 150 Even though Minnesota's historical preservation
statute is unchallenged, the state has dealt with challenges to historical
preservation decisions.151
In State by Archabal v. County of Hennepin,152 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that Hennepin County could not destroy the
Minneapolis National Guard Armory, which was listed on the National
Register.153 This holding was based on the building's protected status
under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act.154 This Act, unlike
Minnesota's historical preservation statute, 155 does not provide for a
mediation process to review proposed alterations and demolitions to
historical property.156
The case went to the Minnesota Supreme Court on appeal from a
declaratory judgment action where the Minnesota historical preservation
office sought to enjoin Hennepin County from tearing down the
Armory.157 The District Court for Hennepin County declared that the
destruction of the building did not violate any environmental protection
laws, and denied the injunction.158
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Armory was a natural
resource deserving of protection, even though the building was no
longer in use. 159 The court realized that allowing the old, unused
building to stand rather than tearing it down and building a
much-needed jail was an unpopular decision. 160 However, the court
determined that "to fashion an exception for historic buildings such as
this one is not within the province of this court." 161 Therefore, the court
reversed the decision of the district court and the Armory was left
standing.162 Archabal is an example of how one court is willing to apply
broad historical preservation principles and support historical
150. See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and application of
North Dakota's arbitration review system).
151. State by Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 416.
152. 495 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1993).
153. State by Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416,426 (Minn. 1993).
154. Id. at 418. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16B.02(4) (1992) (stating "scenic and esthetic
resources shall aslo be considered natural resources when owned by any governmental unit or
agency").
155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.665(2) (1994).
156. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02(4).
157. Archabal, 495 N.W.2d at 417.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 426.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. State by Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416.426 (Minn. 1993).
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preservation, even when the state's historical preservation statute is not at
issue in the action.
A further example of a state court decision accepting historical
preservation can be found in Kansas.1 63  The Kansas historical
preservation statute 164 is generally considered one of the strongest
statutory protections for historical property in the country.165 Recently,
there has been a challenge regarding the preservationist's ability to
control property within the "environs" of historical property.166
In Lawrence Preservation Alliance v. Allen Realty,167 the Kansas
Court of Appeals held that before any hearing on historical property can
be held, the state historical preservation agency must be notified and
allowed to participate at the hearing.168 If the state historical agency is
not allowed to participate, any decision made regarding the historical
property would have failed to consider all "relevant factors,"1 69 as
required by Kansas law.170 Any decision made by the city in such a
manner is subject to remand by the courts for proper consideration.171
The result in Lawrence Preservation Alliance shows that courts are
willing to accept historical preservation efforts as a valuable tool for
preserving the past for future generations and providing a benefit to the
state's citizens, despite the effort or statute's restrictive nature.
On the other hand, despite many courts' acceptance of historical
preservation, it has been held that historical preservation laws cannot be
used to abridge the basic constitutional rights, such as freedom of
religion, of the property owner.1 72 This is especially true when the
preservation action attempts to designate and protect the interior of the
163. Lawrence Preservation Alliance v. Allen Realty, 819 P.2d 138 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
164. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 (1989). The statute provides that no historical property on the
National Register or within the "environs" of property on the National Register can be altered or
destroyed until the SHPO has had time to investigate and comment on the proposed actions. Id.
165. DAVIS, supra note 134, at 72. The Kansas law protects property within the environs of
historical property. No other state provides such extensive protection for historical property. Id. See
infra notes 167-172 and accompanying text (discussing the application of this statute and the Kansas'
courts general acceptance of the restrictions).
166. See Lawrence Preservation Alliance v. Allen Realty, 819 P.2d 138, 148 (Kan. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that the protection of historical "environs" by the Kansas historical preservation statute,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 (1989), provided that the protection is exercised in compliance with the
statute, is a valid means of preserving historical property).
167. 819 P.2d 138 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
168. Lawrence Preservation Alliance v. Allen Realty, 819 P.2d 138, 147 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
This case was an appeal from a remanded decision, Allen Realty, Inc. v. City of Lawrence, 790 P.2d
948 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990), which stated the provisions of § 75-2724 did not amount to a deprivation of
the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Allen Realty, Inc., 790 P.2d at 954.
169. Lawrence Preservation Alliance, 819 P.2d at 148.
170. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724(a) (1989).
171. Lawrence Preservation Alliance, 819 P.2d at 148.
172. See Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm., 564 N.E.2d 571, 574
(Mass. 1990) (holding that restrictions covering the interior of a historic church amounted to an
abridgment of religious freedom).
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property.173 For example, in Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston
Landmarks Committee,174 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the
Boston Landmark Commission could not protect the interior of a
historical church.175 The court stated that such a designation amounted
to an unconstitutional restraint on the owners' First Amendment
religious freedom and the use of such property to exercise that
freedom.176
However, when there are provisions which provide for designation
of interiors which do not affront the owner's constitutional rights, most
states are split as to the validity of such provisions. For example in
United Artists' Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,177 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the protection of the interior of a
historically famous art-deco theatre amounted to an unconstitutional
taking.178 In contrast, in Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America v.
City of New York, 179 the New York Court of Appeals held that the
preservation of the interior of a building which housed the famous Four
Seasons Restaurant was a valid exercise of the city's historical
commission. 180 The plaintiffs, who owned the building, were unable to
alter the main floor area, for this would destroy the historical value of the
restaurant. 181
Thus, despite the variety of historical preservation statutes and
preservation schemes, 182 there is a common trend among state courts to
apply historical preservation principles as a way to provide a benefit for
the citizens of their state.
3. North Dakota's Experience with Historical Preservation
Issues
Generally, North Dakota has followed the trend of creating and
accepting historical preservation statutes under the principle that
historical preservation is a worthwhile goal for the state, as well as a
173. Id.
174. 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
175. Society of Jesus of New England, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574.
176. Id. at 574.
177. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
178. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 622 (Pa.
1993).
179. 603 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1993).
180. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'ns of America v. City of New York, 603 N.Y.S.2d 399. 403
(1993).
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 112-134 and accompanying text (discussing the various types of historical
preservation statutes used by states).
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benefit to its present and future citizens. 183 However, in furthering that
goal, North Dakota uses an arbitration system of review for alteration
and demolition requests. 184 The arbitration system involves a specially
impaneled board of arbitration to decide alteration or demolition
requests.185 North Dakota is the only state which uses this type of
system.186 However, it is interesting to note that the arbitration review
system is only applicable when a political subdivision is involved in
historical preservation. 187 For private citizens, there is no review process
for their alteration and demolition requests.188
When a political subdivision makes an alteration or demolition
request, it first must present its proposal to the state superintendent of
historical preservation before any work can be done.189 If the proposal
is denied, the political subdivision can file for arbitration.1 90 This
demand for arbitration must be made in writing, and the political
subdivision must name three arbitrators.191
Once arbitration review has been demanded, the opposing party,
generally the historical preservation office, has ten days in which to
present three arbitrators.1 92 If this is not done, the moving party,
generally the political subdivision, may apply ex parte to the district
183. See supra notes 135-182 and accompanying text (describing the acceptance of historical
preservation statutes by many state courts based on the principle that historical preservation provides a
benefit to the citizens of their states, and thus should be pursued). See also N.D. CENT. CODE §
55-10-01 (1993) (providing that preservation of historical sites is in the public interest).
184. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1993) (providing for an arbitration system of review
for demolition and alteration requests filed by political subdivisions). See infra notes 185-200 and
accompanying text (detailing the arbitration review process).
185. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6)(1993).
186. See supra notes 112-134 and accompanying text (discussing the various types of state
systems of review for alteration and demolition requests).
187. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6)(1993).
188. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical
Preservation Officer, (Sept. 30, 1994).
189. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 40-02-01-10 (1986). The section states that the political subdivision
must first notify the superintendent by writing and the notice shall include:
a. Name and address of the property.
b. A description of the proposed action.
c. Reasons for proposed action.
d. A copy of any building inspector, fire marshal, workmen's compensation bureau,
planning department, or other official inspection or planning report which forms the basis
for proposing the action.
e. An assessment of all alternatives considered in reaching the decision to propose
alteration or demolition, and the reasons for rejecting those alternatives.
f. A copy of any supporting documentation, such as architect's plans and specifications.
which graphically explains the result of the proposed action if approved by the
superintendent.
Id. These matters must be presented and the request denied before the arbitration process can be
demanded. Id.
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1989).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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court where the property is located and this court will appoint three
arbitrators.193 Once the six arbitrators have been chosen, the appointed
arbitrators have five days in which to appoint a seventh.1 94 In the event
of a failure to do this, the moving party may again ask the district court
to step in and appoint a seventh arbitrator.' 95 It is interesting to note that
in all of the time restrictions that are placed on the selection process for
the arbitrators, there is no such time limit in which the dispute is to be
arbitrated and a decision made.1 96 When a decision is made, however,
that decision is binding,197 and is appealable to the district court and
beyond.198
The arbitration review system of the North Dakota Act' 99 was an
amendment added in 1987200 after the North Dakota Supreme .Court's
decision in County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y of North
Dakota.20 1 In County of Stutsman, the State Board and State Historical
Society wanted to place the Stutsman County Courthouse on the State
Historical Sites Register.2 02 The principle issue of the case was whether
the State Historical Society had the authority to place and remove
property off of the State Registry.2 03 Stutsman County claimed that
property could only be removed if it lost its historical significance or was
destroyed.2 04 Stutsman County wanted to refuse placement of the
courthouse because of the cost required to renovate and maintain the
property .205
The State Historical Board, having heard the County's appeal,
decided to place the property on the State Registry. 206 Stutsman County
appealed from this decision to the District Court for the Southeast
Judicial District. 207 The district court held that because there was no
language in North Dakota Century Code section 55-10-02(4)208
193. Id.




198. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-19 (Supp. 1995).
199. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1989).
200. 1987 N.D. Laws 667, § 1. See North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions,
1987 Senate Standing Committee Minutes of SB 2387 (April 3, 1987) (providing the reasoning behind
the legislature's decision to amend the historical preservation statute).
201. 371 N.W.2d 321 (1985).
202. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321,323 (N.D. 1985).
203. Id. at 324.
204. Id. at 323.
205. ld.
206. Id. at 324.
207. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321,324 (N.D. 1985).
208. Id. at 323 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-02(4) (1983)). Section 55-10-02(4) provides
that::
The 'state historic sites registry' shall be a listing of sites designated by the state historical
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providing a definition of "historical value," the legislature had not
granted the authority to the board to add new sites to the State
Registry. 209 The authority to place property on the state historical
register was reserved for the state legislature. 210 When the County sought
to destroy the courthouse, the historical society filed an appeal with the
supreme court and a motion to stay judgment with the district court. 2 11
The latter motion was denied by the district court. 212 On appeal, the
supreme court reversed the denial to stay judgment and stayed judgment
pending a hearing on the merits of the case. 213
The supreme court determined that the failure of the legislature to
define "historical value" did not destroy the board's authority to place
property on the state registry. 214 Secondly, the court determined that
this authority was not granted in violation of the legislature's power. 2 15
Thus, the supreme court found that the power of the state board was
valid and the placement of the courthouse on the State Registry was
within this authority.2 16 The decision demonstrates the supreme court's
willingness to provide protection for historical preservation efforts. 217
Following the decision in County of Stutsman, the Legislature
determined that the controversy surrounding the case merited an
amendment to the state's historical preservation law. 218 The Legislature
board of the state historical society as possessing historical value, as defined in this
section, and including but not limited to sites enumerated in this chapter. This registry
shall be published and updated annually and distributed in accordance with state law
dealing with publications.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-02(4) (1983).





214. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321,326 (N.D. 1985). The court
stated that it must read statutes to give effect to each section in order not to have idle acts. Id. at 325.
The court determined that North Dakota Century Code § 55-10-02(4) does not define historical value,
but to allow this omission to destroy the entire authority of the statute would run counter to the intent of
the historical preservation statute, North Dakota Century Code § 55-10-01, which states historical
preservation is a goal for the state. Id. at 326.
215. Id. at 327. The court stated that prior to the passage of the historical preservation statute,
the legislature had placed property on historically protected status. Id. The court noted, however, that
because the state was growing more complex, such legislative work was no longer convenient, and
thus. because the legislature has the authority to delegate powers which it no longer has time to
perform, this delegation of power to the state board was valid. Id.
216. Id. at 329.
217. See supra notes 134-181 and accompanying text. This section details the trend that shows a
number of instances where state courts have held in favor of preservation efforts. The decision in
County of Stutsman follows that trend to the extent that the supreme court was willing to accept the
principle, as stated by the legislature, that historical preservation is a valuable goal for the state. 371
N.W.2d at 326.
218. North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387, at 1 (February 13. 1987).
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debated several review process options.219 Included in these discussions
was a public referendum, held in the county of the property's location,
on whether the property should receive protection. 220 This option,
however, was rejected because, generally speaking, historical property
has an impact far beyond the boundaries of one county or city. 221
Therefore, by limiting the referendum to only the county where the
property was located, the public referendum would deny many of the
state's citizens the right to vote on the issue.222
The proposal for an arbitration review system was under criticism
during the debate,2 23 even though the proposal was presented early in the
legislative process by the Association of Counties. 224 Some legislators
argued an arbitration process removed some of the board's power, and
left the decision in one person's (the seventh arbitrator) hands. 225
Others stated that arbitration would put preservationists in a no-win
situation. 226 At one point, there were thoughts to kill the entire bill, but
many legislators stated it was better to pass something than do nothing at
all. 227 Despite misgivings, the arbitration review was passed.228
Thus, under North Dakota law, political subdivisions must contend
with an elaborate system to request and review alteration and demolition
proposals to historical property.229 There is nothing in the legislative
record to show why it was thought appropriate to subject the political
subdivision to such a process and how it would be valuable.230
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF NORTH DAKOTA'S HISTORICAL
PRESERVATION LAW
A. USE OF ARBITRATION TO SETTLE DISPUTES
Currently, North Dakota is the only state which uses a system of
arbitration in reviewing historical property alteration and demolition
219. North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387, at 1 (April 3, 1987).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 3.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1-3.
224. North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387, at 1 (February 13, 1987).
225. North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387, at 8 (April 3, 1987).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Id. at 9.
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1993).
230. North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387, at 1 (April 3. 1987).
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requests by political subdivisions.231 Arbitration has been a successful
way to settle disputes in many areas. 232 Also, most of the litigants
involved in arbitration feel that they have received justice equal to that
which they would have received through the courts. 233 Furthermore,
many judges believe that arbitration provides a faster means of settling
disputes. 234 This decrease in time results in savings of attorney's fees
and other related costs.235
While arbitration has been generally accepted by many federal
judges, 236 arbitration programs in state courts have not achieved the same
level of uniform success or acceptance. 237 Also, there is no hard
evidence that arbitration is applicable to all situations or that it will
provide successful dispute settlement for all types of cases. 238 There has
been commentary stating that arbitration is not entirely applicable when
dealing with issues of public law, such as environmental and land
disputes. 239  Also, there are suggestions that arbitration should be
restricted to areas where there are clearly defined legal rules.240
The type of disputes that arise out of historical site alteration or
demolition requests 24 1 may not be a proper area to exercise an
arbitration system because of the nature of the dispute. 242 Generally, a
historical preservation dispute is an all or nothing proposition. 243 One
231. See supra notes 112-134 and accompanying text (discussing the different historical
preservation statutes currently used in other states).
232. BARBARA S. MEIEHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN
DISTRICT COURTS 123 (1990). This work discusses data generated by the ten federal district courts
(Eastern Pennsylvania, Middle Florida, Western Missouri, Western Oklahoma, Middle North Carolina,
Northern California, Western Michigan, New Jersey, Eastern New York, and Western Texas) which
have mandatory programs for arbitration. Id. at 1. The data revealed no evidence that arbitration is
applicable to all types of cases. Id. at 123.
233. Id. at 82.
234. See Raymond J. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Providing Litigants with a Speedier
and Less Expensive Alternative to the Traditional Court Room Trial, 75 JUDICATURE 41, 41 (1991)
(stating that many judges in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania prefer arbitration for its expediency).
235. See id.
236. See Lynn A. Kerbeshian. ADR: To Be Or...?, 70N.D. L. REV. 381,415 (1994) (discussing
the success of summary jury trials method of alternative dispute resolution).
237. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 668,674 (1986).
238. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 233, at 123. See also Kerbeshian, supra note 237, at 412-13
(stating that the successs of arbitration in all areas is an unresolved issue).
239. Edwards, supra note 237, at 676-77.
240. Id. at 680.
241. See, e.g., County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1985)
(providing an example of where one party wants the historical structure to remain, while the other
wants to completely remove it).
242. See North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387, at 2 (April 3, 1987). One member of the conference committee, Representative
Soreson, was concerned with the ability to arbitrate a decision where he felt there would be little
compromise. Id. at 1. Sorenson felt that the issue of historical preservation would often be an all or
nothing debate with little middle ground in which arbitrators could find agreement. Id. at 2.
243. Id. at 2. Historical preservation is often not easy to debate and find agreement on the issue,
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party wants the structure down or altered and the other party wants to
preserve it.244 Even when the North Dakota arbitration amendment 245
was discussed, many legislators argued that the decision to maintain or
destroy the property should be based on the expertise of the
preservationists. 246 Many doubt that an arbitration process involving
seven arbitrators and possibly two ex parte proceedings will come to an
agreement that is fair to all and meets a general compromise for all
parties. 247 Furthermore, the lack of time constraints on the arbitration
panel to issue a decision could likely cause problems. 248 Finally, the
arbitration system for the historical preservation statute is unique in
North Dakota law. The system does not follow, to the letter, the state's
Uniform Arbitration Act 249 in its selection of the arbitrators. 250 It is
highly likely that the six partisan arbitrators will be unable to reach a
consensus, and the decision to keep, alter, or destroy the property will
come down to one person, the seventh arbitrator. 251
Lastly, there is the worst case scenario for the arbitration process. 252
Because the statute does not impose time limits to settle the dispute, 253
the arbitration panel could become hopelessly deadlocked, and the
historical property would be neglected.254
There should also be concerns regarding the legal development of
historical preservation law in North Dakota, and how an arbitration
and this all or nothing principle was a concern for Representative Shaw as well as Representative
Sorenson. Id.
244. Id.
245. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1993).
246. North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387, at 8 (April 3, 1987).
247. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994). Interview with the Honorable Bruce E. Bohlman, Judge of the District
Court of North Dakota, Northeast Cent. Judicial District, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Sept. 12, 1994). See
also North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Committee
Minutes of SB 2387. at 2 (April 3, 1987) (discussing concerns over the applicability of a seven member
arbitration review board to settle preservation disputes). The type of arbitration system was a concern
even in the passage of the legislation, where Representative Shaw voiced an opinion that such disputes
would likely prove to be very difficult to arbitrate. Id.
248. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994).
249. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20. (1995).
250. Id. Under the North Dakota Uniform Arbitration Act, there is no defined process for the
appointment of arbitrators, except for by agreement of the parties or by appointment by the court. Id.
§ 32-29.2-03.
251. See North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions, 1987 Senate Standing Com-
mittee Minutes of SB 2387, at 2 (April 3, 1987) (stating that this was a concern voiced during the
discussion of the legislation).
252. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl. North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994).
253. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1993) (providing that once the seven arbitrators are
selected, that they "shall proceed to resolve the controversies brought before them").
254. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994).
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system would effect this development. When arbitration is applied to
unsettled areas of the law, there should be cause for alarm 255 because of
the possibility of establishing rules and regulations in the unsettled area
outside of the democratic system of checks that is part of the
governmental process. 256 This process generally includes review by
administrative agencies by officers appointed by elected officials, and a
final review by elected judges.257 This would better facilitate the creation
for the proper legal foundation. When arbitration is in a position to
"delimit" public duties and have an impact on social concerns, there
should also be concern over the application of an arbitration process.
258
There has only been one case in North Dakota involving the state's
historical preservation statute. 259 The decision in County of Stutsman,26o
was the motivation behind the arbitration amendment. 26 1 Although
County of Stutsman clarified many of the issues of historical
preservation, 262 there are many areas in which the historical preservation
statute263 has not been interpreted. 264  Because of uncertainties
surrounding North Dakota historical preservation law, there is a danger
that standards for preservation could be set by private groups - the
arbitrators - outside the democratic checks of the government. 265 It
would be better to settle the issues of historical preservation through a
series of administrative reviews with judicial appeals. 266 After the basic
255. Edwards, supra note 237, at 680.
256. Id.
257. See infra notes 294-318 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed plan for changes to
North Dakota's review system, and the effect that such changes would have on North Dakota's
historical preservation efforts).
258. Edwards, supra note 237. at 676.
259. See County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321,327 (N.D. 1985) (hold-
ing that the North Dakota Historical Board had the authority to place property under historical
preservation). See supra notes 201-216 and accompanying text (discussing the County of Stutsman
case in greater detail).
260.-371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D. 1985).
261. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1993). See supra notes 218-231 and accompanying text
(examining the discussions by North Dakota Legislators during the debate for the passage of the
arbitration system of review). See also North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions. 1987
Senate Standing Committee Minutes of SB 2387, at 2 (Feb. 13, 1987) (detailing the discussions of
legislators during the initial passage of the arbitration amendment).
262. County ofStutsman, 371 N.w.2d at 327. The County of Stutsman court held that the state
historical board did have the authority to place sites on the State Historical Register and that defining
property as having "historical value" was not unconstitutionally vague. Id.
263. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 55-10-01 to -13 (1993).
264. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994). Mr. Hafermehl stated that questions as to the extent of the burden
which could be placed on the owner and how much of an alteration, if any, could be made without
first consulting the preservation office were examples of two unresolved areas. Id.
265. See Edwards, supra note 237, at 677 (stating that arbitration on unsettled areas of law could
result in limitations set by private groups with no governmental oversight).
266. Id. at 676. Judge Edwards states that it is better to solve many public disputes by using
public officials, not strangers, who are more out to maximize the end for a private party. Id. at
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ground rules for settling disputes are established, perhaps then an
arbitration system could be implemented. 267
Although such outcomes are not certainties, North Dakotans should
not have to wait to find out. The goal of North Dakota's historical
preservation law 268 is to preserve property in its original state for the
people of North Dakota and future generations of North Dakotans.
269
Because of the inadequacy of arbitration to settle alteration and
demolition disputes, it is questionable whether the arbitration system
would effectively achieve such a goal.
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF STATUTE IN PRACTICE
Referring back to the Reeves Drive situation, 270 the possible
problems of the arbitration system, one of which is its preclusion of
private citizens, can be seen. If the city seeks to change the historical
property, the city will first inquire with the SHPO.271 If any alteration or
demolition requests are denied, the city will be forced to enter into
arbitration to seek a reversal of the SHPO's decision. 272
However, if a private homeowner in the area wishes to challenge any
proposed changes, they would be unable to participate in the arbitration
because the statute limits the arbitration to political subdivisions.
273
Their only recourse would likely be through the courts, seeking
injunctive relief.274
Thus, the city of Grand Forks would be in the position of arguing
its requests in an arbitration proceeding as well as defending its actions
in court. However, if the state were to use an administrative hearing
process, all parties could have their cases heard at once, and any appeals
could then proceed to the courts.
Also, the arbitration system could possibly affect private citizens
who need approval for demolition or exterior alteration by the way of
676-77. By using public officials, the settlement is made by individuals whose job is to give force to
the statutory provisions with which they work. Id. (quoting Owen M. Fiss. Against Settlement, 93 YALE
LJ. 1073, 1085 (1984)).
267. See Edwards, supra note 238 at 680 (stating that after an area of the law is settled.
arbitration can be a useful tool to reduce an increase in the caseload).
268. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-01 (1993).
269. Id. The preservation statute provides: "It is hereby declared ... [that] the preservation of
historic sites, buildings, structures ... [are for the] benefit of the people of the state of North Dakota."
Id.
270. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the possible application of the
preservation statute to the preservation of historical Granitoid streets in Grand Forks. North Dakota).
271. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(2) (1993).
272. Id. § 55-10-08(6).
273. Id.
274. See Archabal v. County of Hennepin, 495 N.W.2d 416, 417 (Minn. 1993) (showing an
example of where private citizens filed for injunction to stop the demolition of a historically
recognized property). See supra notes 150-163 and accompanying text (discussing, in detail, the
Archabal case and its effect on Minnesota preservation efforts).
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city permits. 275 When a private citizen seeks a city permit to demolish
his or her historical property, does the city become involved in the
demolition of historic property? This is essentially a question of state
action.2 76  The main issue in a state action question is: Is it fair to
attribute the actions of a private citizen to the state? 277
There are two major analyses used to determine whether it is fair to
attribute private action to the state. The first is the public function
doctrine. 278 Under the public function doctrine, the exercise of power
by the private citizen must be involved with a power that is traditionally
"exclusively reserved for the state." 279 The second analysis is the nexus
theory. Under this analysis, there are four ways by which the action of
the private citizen can be attributable to the state. First, the action of the
citizen can be done by command by the state. 280 Second, the state may
have encouraged the private citizen to perform a function as a public
actor.2 81 Third, the action of the private citizen may have created a
"symbiotic relationship" between the private citizen and the public
actor.282 Lastly, if the action was done under some state authority, it can
be attributed to the private citizen. 283
275. See, e.g., GRAND FORKS CrrY CODE, § 18-0506 (1993). The code states that a building permit
is a prerequisite for any construction, repair, alteration or enlargement of any building or structure
within the city limits of Grand Forks. Id.
276. DAVIS, supra note 134, at 16-17.
277. See generally Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
278. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505, 507 (1946) (determining that a person cannot be
criminally punished for constitutionally protected activity in a company owned town simply because it
was against the wishes of the town's management).
279. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). In Jackson, the exercise of
power was the furnishing of electrical power. Id. at 353. The Court stated that if the action was more
closely related to the state, such as elections or eminent domain, state action could be more easily
found. Id. at 352-53.
280. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1. 19 (1948). The Court held that the judicial enforcement of
a valid contract which excluded blacks from purchasing land amounted to a judicial command, and
thus the state action was created. Id. This ruling, however, has been narrowly interpreted by the
Supreme Court in following decisions, and some private/state distinction was to be maintained.
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 902 (12th ed. 1991). See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
254 (1953) (holding that a restrictive covenant enforced against a co-coventor is not a state action);
contra Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230. 230-31 (1957) (holding that an educational
board appointment by state statute and given authority to disburse private funds for educational
purposes is a state actor).
281. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The case involved the proposed sale of
goods, seized in an eviction, and stored at a warehouse. Id. at 151. The Court found that the sale by
the private owner of the warehouse did not amount to a state action, even though there was
encouragement from the state to sell the goods. Id. at 164-65. The Court stated that mere
acquiescence by the state is not enough to create a state action. Id. at 164.
282. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.. 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (ruling that a multitude of
relationships in the right context constitutes state action). In Burton, the issue was whether a
city-backed parking ramp could discriminate against blacks in a coffee shop located in the ramp. Id.
at 716. The Court stated that because the ramp had been built by public funds, was devoted for public
parking, and the state was in joint participation of the operation of the coffee shop, there was the
necessary relationship to create a state action. Id. at 721-26.
283. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982). The Court, in Lugar, stated that
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Under these types of analyses, there is the possibility that a private
citizen may become a state actor when a building permit is required
prior to any alterations of their property. 284 In the Reeves Drive
example, 285 it is doubtful that the public function doctrine 286 would
apply because the action of altering or destroying privately owned
property has never been exclusively reserved for the state. However,
under the nexus theory, 287 there are areas in which a private citizen
seeking a permit to alter or destroy their property could be considered a
state actor.
While there is likely not enough state or city involvement to indicate
that the state commanded the private citizen to act by getting a license,
the licensing requirement might be enough state involvement to create a
symbiotic relationship.288 The private building alterations might then be
attributed to the state. 289 Also, because of the state's authority to require
a building permit, there may be an issue of fair attribution of the private
action to the state. Admittedly, research shows that the state action issue
has never been raised in a historical preservation context, either in North
Dakota or elsewhere. 290 However, based on previous decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, the possibility for such an application
exists. Such application is not inherently good or bad; the real issue is
one of clarification. Until the private citizen is assured of either their
private or public status, and thus the applicable review processes available
to them, there will likely be private individuals unwilling to take
historical preservation action.291
because it is necessary to find a fair attribution of the private action to the state, there must be some
exercise of action created by the state. Id. at 937.
284. DAVIS, supra note 134, at 16-17.
285. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the preservation issues surrounding
the preservation of several historic Granitoid streets in Grand Forks, North Dakota).
286. See supra notes 278-286 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and application of
the public function doctrine).
287. See supra notes 282-285 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and application of
the nexus theory of state action).
288. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and application of the
symbiotic relationship).
289. DAVIS, supra note 134, at 16-17. But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
175-76 (1972) (holding that a state liquor license did not create enough of a symbiotic relationship to
create state action). Even though the Court in Moose Lodge did comment on the complete lack of
relationship found when purchasing a liquor license, it did not comment on permits which provide for a
greater relationship between the private and public actors. Id.
290. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical
Preservation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994).
291. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical
Preservation Officer (Jan. 23, 1994).
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V. PROPOSAL AND ANALYSIS
The North Dakota arbitration system of review for historical
property will not adequately resolve the issues involved with alteration
and demolition requests made by political subdivisions and private
citizens. By making two changes to the current review process, North
Dakota's historical preservation law would be better suited to handle
demolition and alteration review applications. 292
First, North Dakota should consider adopting a system under which
any political subdivision, prior to the commencement of ANY state or
locally funded project, would submit an alteration or demolition
proposal to the SHPO.293 This requirement, would enable the SHPO to
ensure the impact, if any, on historical property within the context of the
state or locally funded project. The requirement of a historical review
proposal for any state or locally funded project has previously been
discussed in North Dakota, but no action towards this requirement has
even been taken. 294 The SHPO would then be required to review the
proposal and to determine the proposal's effect on the historic
property. 295 The SHPO would then have 60 days in which to either
grant or deny the proposal.296 If the proposal is not acted upon in sixty
days, it would be deemed granted. 297 The SHPO would also be required
to determine, through discussions with the applicant, any possible
reasonable alternatives to the proposed alterations or demolitions. 298
During the sixty day interim, the SHPO would be required to hold
hearings regarding the property where interested parties could be
heard.299 The location of the hearings would be at the discretion of the
SHPO.300 The hearings would provide a forum in which the applicant,
292. See Appendix.
293. Requiring that alteration or demolition requests be submitted to the SHPO in accordance
with N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(2) (1993).
294. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Jan. 23, 1995).
295. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text (discussing the alteration review process
used by the majority of states). The proposed system of submitting an alteration request which would
be reviewed by the SHPO would be analogous to the majority of review systems found in other states
which place more emphasis on the expertise of the state historical preservation office. Id.
296. The 60 day waiting period provision is taken from NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:lb-15.131 (West
1991). However, the New Jersey statute allows for 120 days for the state historical board to make a
ruling on any proposal. Id. See also IowA CODE ANN. § 303.30 (West 1988) (applying a sixty day
rule).
297. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing the time restriction on review of a
proposal application).
298. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(2) (1993).
299. IOWA CODE ANN. § 303.30 (West 1988).
300. SEE S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-19B-47 (1992) (stating that the SHPO may hold a public hearing
if deemed necessary).
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concerned citizens, and the Historical Board could have their arguments
heard. 30 1 By providing this type of open forum, the SHPO would be
able to gather as much information as possible from as many different
sources as possible in a limited amount of time. 302 If the SHPO denies
the proposal, the political subdivision could appeal to the district court
for the county in which the property is located.3 0
3
Second, North Dakota should require private citizens operating
under authorized construction permits to comply with this system of
review for alteration and demolition requests.3 04 If historic property is
owned by a private citizen, the owner must notify the SHPO of any
changes or alterations prior to the commencement of such actions.
305
The notification would commence the above stated review process.
306
This inclusion should be made in an effort to clarify the issue of
state action within the historical preservation context. Applying of this
review process to private citizens would not be a per-se restriction on
property-use.3 07 By limiting application of the process to those who are
required to obtain a permit, the issue of whether that individual is or is
not a state actor is removed. 308 Also, the creation of this process would
clarify what is an uncertain area in North Dakota historical preservation
law: Are private citizens required to notify the state historical office
regarding any changes to historical property, and if so, what type of
review process are they afforded? 309 The placing of both private and
public actors under the same system would legislatively end this
confusion. Furthermore, by placing private citizens under the same type
of review process as political subdivisions, the process would likely
301. IOWA CODE ANN. § 303.30 (West 1988).
302. DAVIS, supra note 134, at 25. The project editor states that a review process would draw
attention to a proposed project which is damaging to historical property. Id. Also, the interim time
period gives both sides the opportunity to develop their arguments and develop possible alternatives.
Id.
303. See ALA. CODE § 11-68-10 (Supp. 1994) (providing appeal to the circuit court in which the
property is located).
304. Supra note 134, at 16-17.
305. See ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.090 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 6E-10 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (both
providing that private landowners can be placed under the states' historical preservation statute).
306. See supra notes 294-305 and accompanying text (discussing the proposal, for North Dakota.
of a review process where proposed alterations or demolitions are reviewed with more input from the
state historical preservation office than the current arbitration system allows).
307. DAVIS, supra note 134, at 16. But see ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.090 (providing when a private
person proposes a project on historic property, the state process applies, regardless of permit issue);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 6E-10 (providing that any construction or alteration, in "any nature, by, for, or
permitted" by a private citizen evokes the state review process).
308. See supra notes 275-291 and accompanying text (discussing the legal possibilities of a
private citizen becoming a state actor due to the requirement of a municipal building permit for
alterations or demolitions). See also DAVIS, supra note 134, at 16-17 (commenting that most states
have required private citizens operating under permits to file an application for review).
309. Telephone Interview with Louis Hafermehl, North Dakota Deputy State Historical Preser-
vation Officer (Sept. 30, 1994).
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become more streamlined. In a joint proceeding, where a political
subdivision and private owner are involved in a historical preservation
issue, the arguments for both sides could be heard in one proceeding. 3 10
This type of review system, when applied to both political
subdivisions and private citizens, would better serve the state's goal of
preserving historical property for North Dakotans.311 The removal of
the arbitration system would allow for the development of the body of
law by both the public preservationists and the courts, and would
eliminate the possibility of privately created regulations on historical
property. 312 By placing the development of this legal area in the hands
of those public officials most familiar with it, there is better assurance
that the development would be in accord with North Dakota law.
313
Also, the changes would give more power to the State Historical
Preservation Officer and her staff.314 The advantages of giving the state
historical preservation office a powerful hand was recognized by the
legislature even as they passed the arbitration amendment and effectively
removed much of the SHPO's power. 315 The proposed plan would also
do away with the possibility of two ex parte judicial proceedings, 3 16 thus
reducing as well as streamlining the judicial involvement in the review
process. The courts' involvement would be limited to an appeal from
the decision of the Historical Preservation Board.
Furthermore, because the current arbitration system puts no time
restrictions on decisions, 317 there is the possibility that an arbitration
could continue indefinitely. Under the proposal made by this Note, the
State Historical Preservation Board would have sixty days to review an
application. Thereafter, the review process would be subject to the more
efficient and timely action in the courts. Admittedly, because the
arbitration review system has never been challenged, it is difficult to say
310. See supra notes 272-276 and accompanying text (discussing the possible problems involved
where both private and public entities have concerns regarding the same piece of historical property).
311. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-01 (1993). The statute provides that the goal of historical
preservation is for the inspiration, benefit, and use for all North Dakotans. Id.
312. See Edwards, supra note 237, at 676-77. Judge Edwards stated his concerns about the use
of arbitration in areas of the law which had not yet seen a full body of law created by the courts from
which arbitrators could draw on in making their decisions. Id.
313. Id.
314. The apparent removal of the historical board's authority and power in dealing this historical
preservation was one of the concerns when the legislation providing for the arbitration system was
passed in 1987. North Dakota Senate Committee on Political Subdivisions. 1987 Senate Standing
Committee Reports of SB 2387, at 4 (April 3, 1987). Some legislators were concerned that by moving
to arbitration or a popular vote, the decisions of what property is protected and what property is not
would be in the hands of those who were not qualified to make such decisions. Id.
315. Id.
316. N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(6) (1993).
317. Id.
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that the stated problems would ever become a reality. 318 It is also
possible that the application of an administrative review process could
spawn another bloated government bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the
commentary surrounding the application of arbitration systems suggests
that applying arbitration to issues of historical preservation would result
in an improper development of the law, as well as inadequate protection
for the historical property. 319 Furthermore, because of the defined time
limits placed on the administrative review, the foot-dragging that is often
associated with administrative review would likely be alleviated.
Therefore, the proposed changes would not force anyone down a long
grind of administrative review. Rather, it would help facilitate the
protection of historical property by providing for the proper
development of the law and providing greater efficiency in the review
process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Adopting a review system that emphasizes the expertise of the North
Dakota State Historical Preservation Officer and the members of her staff
would provide benefits for North Dakotans not currently available.
Alteration and demolition requests filed under an administrative review
system would allow for expert review of all requests, would develop
historical preservation law under trained public officials, and would
provide a much more economical system for the courts and their role in
historical preservation. Also, it would do away with the unwieldy and
likely time consuming arbitration system currently in place. As a whole
it would make North Dakota's alteration and demolition review process
much more effective. Because of this, North Dakota's historic
preservation goals would be achieved more effectively, and the balancing
needed to reach the twin aims of progress and preservation would be
more readily achieved.
James E. Smith320
318. See supra notes 231-269 and accompanying text (discussing the application of arbitration in
different legal contexts, and the conclusion that there has been no information on the applicability or
effectiveness of an arbitration review system to historical preservation issues).
319. See supra notes 246-269 and accompanying text (pointing out that several legislators were
concerned about the application of the arbitration review system and several commentators have
voiced their opinions regarding the use of arbitration in unsettled areas of the law).
320. The author would like to thank Judge Bruce E. Bohlman of the Northeast Central Judicial





This is a statutory proposal based upon the research and writing of
this article. This appendix borrows from the historical preservation
statutes of Alaska (Alaska Stat. §§ 41.35.070 & 41.35.090 (1993));
Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 6E-10 (1985)); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. §
303.30 (1988)); and South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 1-19B-
42 (1992)).
I. Alteration and demolition made by political subdivisions:
Prior to the commencement of any project by a political subdivision
which may effect historic property, the agency or officer shall advise the
state historical board and allow the state historical board an opportunity
to review the effect of the proposed project on historic properties. No
project shall be commenced until the state historical board has been
given the opportunity to review the project.
The state historical board shall have sixty (60) days in which to
review the proposal. If no action is taken by the state historical board
within this period, the proposal will be deemed granted.
During the sixty day period, the state historical board shall hold
hearings where all interested parties shall have the opportunity to be
heard. The location of these hearings will be determined by the State
Historical Preservation Officer.
If the state historical board deems that the project does not have an
adverse effect on the historical property, the state board shall issue to the
political subdivision a certificate of appropriateness. This certificate of
appropriateness will detail the project and the result the project will have
on the historical property. This certificate of appropriateness will
become part of the historical property's official record.
If the state historical board determines the project will have an
adverse effect on the historical property, the project may not commence.
The political subdivision may alter the project and reapply to the state
historical board. Any decision made by the state historical board which
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is adverse to the intended project by the political subdivision may be
appealed to the district court for the county in which the property is
located.
Any action taken without the consent of the state historical board
will cause the political subdivision to be subject to suit for enjoinment of
such action by the state historical board.
II. Alteration or demolition made by private citizens:
Any private citizen, prior to the commencement of any project
which may effect historical property, must notify the state historical
board of any proposed changes or alterations. No project shall be
commenced until such notice has been given. This section pertains only
to those private citizens who have obtained construction permits as
required by the political subdivision of residence.
The state historical board shall have sixty (60) days in which to
review the proposal. If no action is taken by the state historical board
within this period, the proposal will be deemed granted.
During the sixty day period, the state historical board shall hold
hearings where all interested parties shall have an opportunity to be
heard. The location of these hearings will be determined by the State
Historical Preservation Officer.
If the state historical board deems that the project does not have an
adverse effect on the historical property, the state board shall issue to the
private citizen a certificate of appropriateness. This certificate of
appropriateness will detail the project and the result the project will have
on the historical property. This certificate of appropriateness will
become part of the historical property's official record.
If the state historical board determines the project will have an
adverse effect on the historical property, the project may not commence.
The private citizen may alter the project and re-apply to the state
historical board. Any decision made by the state historical board which
is adverse to the intended project by the private citizen may be appealed
to the district court for the county in which the property is located.
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Any private citizen that takes action without the state historical
board's review of the proposed action will be subject to suit for
enjoinment by the state historical board.

